The Mantra "We don't have Free Will"

I'm sick of people claiming that free will is an illusion, that it is rational and scientific to hold this.  Yet, they seem extremely reluctant to specify what this actually means.  That my consciousness doesn't actually do anything? So, I'm typing out these words, but it's not my consciousness doing it?

Frequently they might say they believe in "determinism" but without specifying exactly what is meant by this term.   I guess they mean that the four forces in nature, (gravitation, electromagnetism, weak and strong nuclear forces) represent true innate causes in the world and all change in the physical world is due exclusively to the interaction of these four forces?  Well, at least that's clear. So they really do mean my consciousness does absolutely nothing, not even in any train of thought I might entertain! Which it is very easy to refute as I do in the first three paragraphs of an essay I wrote.

But then they shift and obfuscate and claim we don't have free will as the environment influences our behaviour! Well, yes . . when I'm thirsty I'm more likely to drink water (or ribena at least). But no one in the history of the Universe has denied our bodily needs influence our behaviour! And even here, I can ignore my urge to drink.  

Or they say that we don't have free will as our behaviour is in principle predictable. Well gosh, people will stoop down and pick up a £50 note if they see one lying on the pavement outside. So they don't have free will as their behaviour was predictable!  But why does the predictability of peoples' behaviour entail we lack free will?  They never say! I address this issue in the same essay I linked to above under the heading Free Will and Determinism.

So this initial claim we don't have free will is watered down and down until it means nothing so far as I can tell. One would have to behave randomly to satisfy their apparent definition of "free will". But then, predictably enough, they say acting randomly isn't free will either.  Little wonder they reject it.

Free Will

What the heck do people mean when they claim we don't have free will? That our consciousness doesn't actually do anything? Look, we are directly acquainted with our ability to move our bodies, say what we think, think what we will, etc. It's sheer lunacy to suppose we don't have free will in this sense. I know that many scientists say we don't, but many of them are the same people who assert animals are not conscious. People need to get real, stop believing the most transparent falsehoods just because someone in authority says it. Exercise a bit of common sense.



Or some might concede our consciousness is causal, but say this doesn't amount to free will. We do what we do because of what we are, and all that malarkey. This seems to me to amount to little more than I do what I do because of my essence. Well gosh, I'm a happless puppet of my essence...  Meaningless nonsense, a desperate attempt to rescue this "no free will" claim.



For those interested, on my other blog I have written a comprehensive essay on this whole issue. Possibly my best ever blog post, although unfortunately it hasn't garnered much interest, nor comprehension. Go here.

A Causal Consciousness, Free Will, and Dualism

Consciousness is necessarily causally efficacious

It is widely believed by scientists and philosophers, and even the scientifically educated public, that all change in the world is wholly a result of unbroken chains of physical causes and effects. Voluntary behaviour will constitute no exception. More importantly, even the direction our thoughts take will also constitute no exception. But, at least in regards to our thoughts, this does not seem to me to be tenable. Let's see why.



If the scientists and philosophers are correct the direction in which our thoughts develop are not influenced by our consciousness, for they are purely a result of chains of physical causes and effects; presumably the underlying neuronal activity.  Consider, though, that one knows in the most immediate manner possible that oneself is conscious. This awareness, moreover, is not an instantaneous thing, it must be smudged out in time. Hence, one might entertain the thought, 'yes, I know for certain I myself am conscious', even if not expressed explicitly in words. Could this thought, this realisation, be purely due to chains of physical causes and effects without one's actual consciousness playing any role in the fruition of this thought? No, because this certainty, this thought, is clearly due to one's immediate and direct apprehension of one's own consciousness. In other words, it is simply incoherent to suppose one could be certain of one's own consciousness through physical chains of causes and effects alone.  At least in this instance, consciousness is an indispensable ingredient and cannot be causally irrelevant. 

But, once we have understood and agreed with this, the thesis that only physical causation applies in the direction of our thoughts, unravels.  We know that it is false.  For it is scarcely likely that consciousness plays a role in this one thought -- 'yes, I know for certain I myself am conscious' -- but purely chains of physical causes and effects are wholly responsible for all our other thoughts.  It is surely reasonable to infer consciousness is an essential ingredient in the direction of all our thoughts. 

What, though, if I speak out the words, 'yes, I know I am conscious'? Here, unlike my thoughts, I cannot have certainty. Perhaps my thoughts do not cause the verbal expression of such thoughts. That it is just a wholly unrelated fact that everything I think and mentally choose is reflected in the verbal and physical expression of such thoughts and choices. In other words, that I find myself in this body that, contrary to what it seems, I have no control over whatsoever, but nevertheless behaves exactly as if it does! Apart from the outlandish nature of this suggestion, we need to remember that unbroken chains of physical causes and effects were supposed to be universal. If my thoughts are not subject to such unbroken chains of physical causes, then presumably what those thoughts appear to directly cause -- namely the neural correlates and behavioural manifestation of such thoughts -- will also not be so subject.

The causal efficacy of consciousness is not compatible with materialism

The reductive materialist might claim there is no incompatibility between a causally efficacious consciousness on the one hand, and on the other, that all change is the world is characterised by unbroken chains of physical causes and effects. He justifies this by maintaining that conscious experiences, such as our reasoning processes, are literally identical to physical processes in the brain. If a train of thought is literally identical to some physical processes, and these physical processes have causal powers, then it necessarily follows that the train of thought has causal powers too.



So, he will claim that my argument is question-begging since I am assuming at the outset a position called dualism. Dualism is the idea that consciousness is not the same thing as a material process, even though it still might be created by such material processes.  Interactive dualism, in addition, holds that the body affects consciousness with consciousness, in its turn, affecting the body. It's the commonsensical position that we all tend to instinctively believe (even materialists tend to admit we are all instinctively interactive dualists). So, what if reductive materialism is correct. Does my argument still apply?



I have argued in various places elsewhere e.g. here, that I do not regard reductive materialism as being tenable. But, even if it were tenable, reductive materialism cannot circumvent my argument. Let's now see why.



Let's suppose that when we reason something through and reach a sound conclusion, we have the following mental chain:



i) a → b → c → d → e



And, simultaneously, we have the following correlated physical chain in the brain:



ii) A → B → C → D → E



The materialist claims that “a” is identical to “A”, “b” is identical to “B” etc. But, nevertheless, we have two different accounts of how a/A progresses to e/E. In "i", we have a train of reasoning which, when we attain an understanding of something, will have involved rational connections between thoughts. In "ii", we have a chain of physical causes and effects in the form of interactions of physical particles that can be mathematically described by the laws of physics. If any type of materialism is true, then everything has the ability to be explained in terms of the physical as exemplified in account "ii". Account "i" is simply not required since physical laws, which describe physical processes, make no reference to reasoning, nor indeed do they make any reference to intentions, desires, plans, or any other aspect of consciousness. But, it then follows that reasoning something through is causally irrelevant. Hence, identifying reasoning and the rest of our mental life with physical processes doesn't allow us to escape from the conclusion that our consciousness is causally irrelevant. However, as I’ve already explained, this is surely rendered false if we are not to undermine the complete certainty in the existence of our own consciousness.



As an aside, this constitutes an additional reason why reductive materialism could not be correct. Reductive materialism, by definition, only allows physical causation, therefore consciousness, in and of itself, cannot make a difference. But, if the above argument is sound, it must do so.

Various Objections

I do not believe my argument can be circumvented. But, for the sake of completeness, I shall now look at four of the commonest objections that have been advanced against interactive dualism.  That is to say, that have been advanced against the notion that consciousness in and of itself could be causally efficacious.

1. Conservation of Energy

People often assert that if consciousness causally influences the underlying neural activity, then the principle of conservation of energy must be violated. Imagine a billiard ball that starts rolling on its own accord without anything, such as another ball, impacting upon it. Then, if the rest of the world is unchanged, we would have an overall increase in energy that will equal the kinetic energy of the moving ball. Similarly, it is maintained that for consciousness to initiate any material processes instead of any antecedent physical causes, the total energy of the system will be increased. In both cases, conservation of energy is violated.



We need to take a step back here and remind ourselves that current science wholly leaves out consciousness in its description of reality (see a blog post by me). I think, though, that this will eventually be remedied and a theory will be dreamt up that will reveal consciousness to be non-reducible. However, this will be a radical break from existing theories since we are admitting into the domain of science that which is very different from the structure and function that it currently describes and investigates.



The important point is this: any such theory will have consciousness having an impact on the world. Will such a theory, therefore, entail an ever spiralling increase in total energy? Let's consider what is being said here. Essentially, they're saying, we have no idea how consciousness exists and what possible theory will accommodate it, but whatever that theory might transpire to be, a causally efficacious consciousness will result in an increase in the total amount of energy in the world. But, since we have no idea what form such a theory will take, how on earth can they know this? Why on earth can consciousness not use up energy that is matched by a corresponding depletion of energy elsewhere? I submit no-one is in any position to claim that this cannot happen. Certainly, at the very least, they must provide a justification for their allegation rather than simply stating it.

2. How can the immaterial impact on the material?

A related objection is that an immaterial consciousness is wholly different from the physical realm, so how could consciousness affect the physical, or indeed vice versa? I think the idea here relates to the fact that consciousness has no location, no mass, no physical properties whatsoever. So, how could it affect that which does have a location, a mass and other various physical properties? Underpinning this is the notion that all influences must be physical chains of contiguous causes and effects. So, how can consciousness, which has no location, no mass and so on, possibly influence the physical realm?



I suggest that the people who voice this objection have a certain view of reality where only certain types of regularity are permitted; namely a mechanistic view of reality where all changes are captured by such contiguous physical chains of causes and effects. Essentially, they hold the view that A influences B because there is some innate power in the world that travels from A to B and necessitates change in B.



But, why must reality be limited to such regularities? Why must causes be contiguous? What permits us to a priori rule out a reality that admits influences from consciousness, or indeed even mystical principles, or magic and so on? Note that in saying causes may not need to be contiguous, we are not contradicting any physical laws. Rather, we are contradicting the mechanistic view of reality, which at best is a presupposition of science, or at least it was a presupposition of science back in the 17th and 18th Centuries. Physics simply tries to model reality based on observations in the past to predict events in the future. We call these regularities physical laws. I do not believe we can impose a priori constraints on the patterns we find there, that is we cannot say reality must conform to contiguous causes. Empirical investigation should guide our beliefs rather than a priori presuppositions. Should we dismiss the phenomenon of entanglement because it contravenes such assumptions? And, if we don't, then the alleged universality of contiguous physical causes and effects is refuted. Where one exception is found, we can surely not be surprised if we find others. For an elaboration on this topic, I recommend people read this blog post by myself.

3. No influences apart from physical processes have ever been detected

It is often claimed that only material influences in the brain have ever been experimentally detected. The implication here if there were any influence from a non-material consciousness, then it would have been experimentally detected by now.



We need to bear in mind here that neuroscientists are almost exclusively materialists, and certainly, they will assume that only physical causation is at work in the brain. But, that strongly suggests that any influence from consciousness is simply not being looked for at all. Any firing of neurons will simply be taken for granted to have been caused by prior physical events. We also need to bear in mind that any influence from consciousness might well be minute since very small changes can cascade to larger and larger effects. In which case, even if they were looking, our functional MRI's lack the resolution to make any assertions in this regard.

4. Experiments by Libet et al

Experiments by the neurologist Benjamin Libet and others appear to imply that our conscious decisions do not cause our voluntary acts, rather it is the state of the brain immediately prior to the conscious decision that is the real and sole cause of our behaviour. Here is a youtube video briefly outlining Libet's experiment.



So, the experiments seem to suggest that instead of my thought, my decision, flexing my wrist, it was prior activity in my brain. In the original experiment, this prior activity occurred around a third of a second before the conscious decision. Libet himself thought that a role for the will was still present in the form of the veto, or what has been termed "free won't". This veto refers to the fact that even after the initiation of this brain activity, we still have the power to stop ourselves from flexing our wrist. Moreover, this veto is not likewise initiated by its own prior brain activity, hence seemingly representing a genuine power of consciousness.



There have been many objections made against Libet's experiment. I won't go into them here since, recently, there's been news of a claim that we have been mistaken in our interpretation of the significance of this prior brain activity. Go here. It seems, in a nutshell, that the prior brain activity held to cause the decision is largely an artefact of the methods used to analyse the data.

Free Will and Determinism

Having now established at the very least a limited role for the causal efficacy of consciousness per se, and, in addition, seen that the various objections to an immaterial causal consciousness have no bite, can we conclude that we have "free will"? One might think obviously yes, indeed I would count myself as one of them. However, it is frequently claimed that free will involves more than a causally efficacious consciousness. Why is this, and is this claim justified?



Consider the claim that our behaviour is purely the inevitable result of chains of causes and effects stretching back to the distant past. Such a thesis is referred to as causal determinism. Typically, these chains are regarded as physical chains. However, since I have concluded that consciousness plays at least some role, then this is untenable. But, what about mental chains of causes and effects, or a combination of physical and mental chains? Perhaps one's psychological state at any given moment compels all future psychological states? In which case, at least in principle, our behaviour will be just as predictable as that which pertains within the physical realm.



In fact, a great deal of our behaviour does appear to be predictable. For example, the vast majority of us, on spotting a wad of £20 notes on the ground, would stoop down, pick the notes up, and stuff them in our pocket. If someone is parched and water is available, then it is pretty predictable they will have a drink. It is predictable that I will argue against materialism, and not for it. More generally, the more we get to know a person, the more we will be able to predict his behaviour or the views he will express. Does the predictability of our behaviour entail we lack free will?



We need to be leery here of a logical fallacy called affirming the consequent. To give an example:



1. If the lamp is broken the room would be dark.

2. The room is dark.

3. Therefore the lamp is broken.



This is invalid. For example, the lamp might be switched off. Likewise, from the fact that physical processes, which lack free will, are predictable, we cannot definitively conclude that our behaviour, although also often predictable, also lacks free will. Further information is required: namely, whether the predictability of our behaviour is derived from the same type of causes that are responsible for the predictability found in the physical realm.



To cast some light on this question, let's consider the behaviour of objects as described by physical laws. They are typically regarded as being constrained to behave the way they do. In other words, they couldn't possibly behave otherwise than what they do. For example, if the Earth were to suddenly stop in its path around the Sun and start jigging up and down, this would be regarded as miraculous. It's not just the case that it would never happen, rather it seems it could never happen.



Does the same apply to our apparently freely chosen behaviour? Consider the case of ignoring the wad of £20 notes on the ground and simply walking on by. Unless one is rich, it would be irrational to do this and it would never happen, not even if we reran the Universe countless times. But, could it happen?



I think people are often confused here in that they conflate would never with could never. Simply because people may inevitably choose a certain action -- for example to quench their thirst if they are parched -- this does not mean that they could not do otherwise. There is nothing external to consciousness that compels people to pick up that glass of water. Rather the individual decides to do so. But at least he has the capacity to not pick up the glass, even though inevitably he will pick it up.



Further, the idea of a mental chain of cause and effect wholly accounting for the procession of our thoughts and decisions is suspect in any case. It is implied that such a chain will be similar to a physical causal chain, such as exemplified by a chain of dominoes falling on each other. However, in a so-called "mental chain", although the prior links in the chain play some role in one’s current mental state, that doesn’t seem to me to be the full story. Consider when we think something through. The path our thoughts follow in our chain of thought is not just dictated by previous links, that is it’s not just dictated by something already understood. It is also affected and guided by a contemporaneous unfolding understanding derived from our non-material selves.



In addition, we should also bear in mind that physical chains of causes and effects presuppose that there exist genuine impersonal forces in nature. Perhaps, though, something like gravitational force and the other 3 forces, simply do not exist any more than centrifugal force does (physicists do not consider centrifugal force to be a real force). I address this issue here. If indeed there are no impersonal forces that compel reality to behave as it does, then it may be that there is no explanation why reality exhibits the patterns it does – it is just a brute fact. The pertinent point here is that if we do not even know that the physical realm is constrained to behave the way it does, we can infer nothing about any alleged constraints on free will.



So, I conclude we have compelling reasons to suppose that the predictability of our behaviour stems from a differing ultimate cause to that within the physical realm. Hence, this causal determinism argument gives us no reason to doubt our free will.

Free will and not wanting what we want

There are those who have argued that one's desires or interests themselves are not amenable to one's control. In short, I cannot want what I want. For example, I am interested in various philosophical issues. But, I have very little interest in celebrities. I cannot instead choose to be interested in celebrities and uninterested in philosophy.



At least as an objection to the whole concept of free will, I regard this argument to be preposterous. If I could so choose to be interested in celebrities and not in philosophy, then I would be changing my essence, what I essentially am. It is no restriction on free will if it results in my self changing. In response, the free will detractor might then argue that one did not choose to be the self or essence one is. However, this seems to implicitly suppose we are purely material beings that came into being sometime between conception and birth, both of which I have argued against and do not accept. If my essence is non-material, then I am not a result of the accidental collocation of impersonal forces. Rather, I am self-defined, so to speak.



Nevertheless, this “not wanting what we want” argument does at least have a degree of merit. For it seems we could have more control over our wants and desires without it apparently impacting on our essence. For example, surely our free will would be enhanced if one could choose not to feel anger under certain circumstances? Or, if one could choose not to be addicted to unhealthy foods? These and countless other examples point to the fact that our free will is more restricted then we would ideally like it to be. But it does nothing to establish the notion that we wholly lack free will.

Conclusion

I do not believe my argument for the causal efficaciousness per se of consciousness can be circumvented. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, I also considered the various arguments that have been advanced that contend our consciousness, at least if considered to be distinct from its underlying neural activity, cannot be causally efficacious. I do not believe they pass muster. Indeed, the first two arguments -- namely, the alleged violation of the conservation of energy and the impossibility of the immaterial affecting the material -- appear to be ill-thought-out, to say the least. So, we have good reason to suppose our consciousnesses are causally efficacious per se, and no reason, so far as I can see, to doubt such a conclusion.



Of course, such a causally efficacious consciousness does not manifest itself constantly. Much of our behaviour is on what might be labelled auto-pilot. When we're walking somewhere, we're not consciously thinking about putting one foot in front of the other. When playing tennis we do not consciously think of the type of stroke to return. But, we do decide to walk to a particular destination, and we do decide to play a game of tennis. And this is what is important. For it is scarcely any threat to our autonomy that we are not subject to the necessity of having to think of every step we take and every tennis stroke we make.



Finally, what about free will? Does a causally efficacious consciousness constitute free will? It is my consciousness and not any prior physical activity in the world that makes choices. But, of course, our behaviour is nevertheless often perfectly predictable. However, I have argued that this doesn't impact on our free will. I conclude that under any reasonable conception of free will that we have it.

Materialism/Physicalism is incompatible with our ability to reason

5/11/2019 Edited to add: For an expanded and superior consideration of this issue, see my A Causal Consciousness, Free Will, and Dualism.


Contemporary wisdom holds that all physical events have entirely physical causes -- causes cashed out in terms of physical processes that we can potentially measure. This includes everything we ever say and do. This might be taken to suggest that our reasoning, our intentions, plans and so on, don't actually do anything.

However, it seems clear to me that our reasoning must have causal powers. It cannot merely be physical processes that have causal powers. Otherwise thinking something through, and reaching an understanding, would be illusory since any conclusion at the end of a chain of reasoning would not be caused by the chain of reasoning itself, but rather by the neural correlates of the chain of reasoning. If this is so then we can have no more reason to think that our reasoning processes will lead to true conclusions, than false conclusions (see my Can consciousness be causally inefficacious? for a more comprehensive defence of this point).

Materialists often agree with this but assert that materialism does not have this consequence. It does not have this consequence because, so they claim, conscious experiences, such as our reasoning processes, are literally identical to physical processes in the brain. If a train of thought is literally identical to some physical processes, and these physical processes have causal powers, then it necessarily follows that the train of thought itself has causal powers too. So we have no problem here.


I beg to differ.


Let's suppose that in the brain we have a physical causal chain:

1. A → B → C → D → E



And we have a mental chain representing a chain of reasoning:
 

2. a → b → c → d → e



Now, of course, the materialist claims that “A” is identical to “a”, “B” is identical to “b” etc.
But nevertheless, we have 2 different accounts of how A/a progresses to E/e. In "1" we have the interactions of molecules as mathematically described by the laws of physics. In "2" we have a train of reasoning which, when we attain an understanding of something, will have involved rational connections between thoughts.

Now if materialism/physicalism is true, then everything has the ability to be explained in terms of the physical as exemplified in "1". Account "2" is simply not required, since physical laws, which describe physical processes, make no reference to reasoning, nor indeed do they make any reference to intentions, desires, plans, or any other aspect of consciousness. Indeed, reasoning only comes into the picture for a vanishingly medium part of the world; namely brain processes, and a minority of brain processes at that. And it is held by materialists that physical laws provide a sufficient explanation for these minority of brain processes just as much as they provide a sufficient explanation for the rest of the Universe.

But it then follows that reasoning something through is causally irrelevant. Hence identifying reasoning, and the rest of our mental life, with physical processes, doesn't allow us to escape an epiphenomenalist position. I regard this as a reductio ad absurdum of materialism.

Can consciousness be causally inefficacious?

5/11/2019 Edited to add: For an expanded and superior consideration of this issue, see my A Causal Consciousness, Free Will, and Dualism.


My very first blog entry a logical proof that we all have free will wasn't greeted with a great deal of comprehension.  Hence
this is another attempt to try and convey what I wrote there.   I'm
also motivated by the fact that I'm encountering a lot of people, especially scientists -- for example in The Myth of an Afterlife
-- expressing their view that the scientific evidence very strongly suggests
that our consciousness plays no causal role whatsoever in anything we do, say, or think.  Frequently
the experiments of Benjamin Libet and  subsequent similar experiments such as carried out by John-Dylan Haynes are invoked in this regard. It is claimed that
such research show that decisions to press either one of two buttons can be
predicted with a success rate of sixty percent, 7-10 seconds before one
actually consciously makes a decision (chance would suggest fifty percent). 
Of course, as I argued in my blog entry about the nature of free will,
the ability to predict has very little to do with free will and a fortiori has
very little to do with the causal efficacy of consciousness.  For example
the ability for someone to predict that I will pick up a £20 note I spot
outside before I decide to do so, wouldn't have any implications for my free
will, nor does it suggest that it isn't my conscious decision which causes me
to stoop down to pick up the note. An instrument measuring brain activity might detect a proclivity or
propensity on my part to behave in a given manner, but I don't think this has
any implications for free will, nor the causal efficacy of consciousness. 
But let's leave this aside in the context of this blog entry.







When we maintain something has
no causal efficacy, what we are saying is that it has no causal impact on its
environment whatsoever.  If some object -- let's say a rock -- has no
causal efficacy whatsoever this means that we wouldn't be able to see it since
no light could be reflected off it to enter our eyes.  Nor could we touch
it since the electrons near the surface of the rock would lack any causal power
to repel the electrons near the surface of the tips of our fingers.  Our
hand would pass straight through it! Indeed it would seem that a causally
inefficacious rock cannot be distinguished from a non-existent rock.  And
the same applies to any physical thing or process.  That is to say that in
order to exist a physical thing or process must possess causal powers. 
Even if we reject this it surely is the case that, regardless of whether it
makes sense to talk about the existence of a causally inefficacious thing or process, we could
never ever know about its existence.



  



Now the reason why so many
people are convinced consciousness has no causal efficacy is because they hold
that all change in the world originates from unbroken chains of physical causes
and effects. This will not only apply to our conscious
decisions to behave in a given manner, but will also apply to the progression of our thoughts too.  Let's suppose
that in the brain we have a physical causal chain

A → B → C → D → E
  

But each physical event causes a mental event. 

So A → a, B →
b, C → c, D → d, E → e  where a,b,c,d and e all stand for mental
events. 

Thus we have an apparent chain of thought  a → b → c → d → e,
but this is in fact an illusion.  Hence the direction that my thoughts
take when I think something through and reach certain conclusions, is not
guided by my developing understanding as a chain of thought unfolds. 
Indeed it will have nothing whatsoever to do with my understanding. 
Rather the direction a chain of thought takes is wholly dictated by impersonal
physical laws.  The direction of our thoughts is wholly imposed from
without, in other words by physical laws, just as the Moons orbit is wholly
determined by impersonal physical laws (gravitation in the latter case).





I now maintain that this is simply untenable. First of all I would maintain that we
know, indeed with complete certainty, of the existence of our own
consciousness. One is in direct contact with one's own consciousness, as it
were. At this instance, and in the most immediate sense, I now apprehend I'm
having certain experiences. Indeed, to have experiences at all, is by
definition to be conscious since to have experiences just is to be conscious.
So the first thing to say is that if indeed consciousness is wholly causally
inefficacious, then it is the only causally inefficacious existent we could
know about!





Moreover, when I entertain the thought of the certainty of my own existence,
it must have some temporal duration.  I might think to myself yes I
know I am conscious.  Of course it might not be put explicitly in
words, but this thought, this conviction, must be of some temporal
duration.  But if consciousness is wholly casually inefficacious, then
this thought as it reaches fruition is caused by neuronal activity rather than
caused by any unfolding understanding on my part. But since it is this understanding, this conscious conviction, that justified my certainty, then in denying the casual
efficacy of this understanding or conscious conviction, this then means my certainty cannot
be justified.  But then we reach an absurdity since one cannot possibly be
mistaken in one's realization of one's own consciousness.  In other words
we cannot escape the conclusion that it is one's unfolding understanding which
causes my knowledge of my own consciousness.



And if this thought -- yes I am definitely conscious  -- is
not caused by the underlying neuronal activity (or at least not wholly so),
then we know with absolute certainty that consciousness is causally
efficacious.  Hence there can be no good reason to doubt that this won't
also apply to other instances of reaching an understanding by thinking things
through. And it will apply to our decisions and our choices.  Since our
voluntary behaviour invariably follows on from our decisions to act in a
certain way, then it would be reasonable to infer that it applies here
too.  In other words consciousness must necessarily be causally
efficacious.  Any scientific evidence which seems to suggest otherwise
therefore needs to be reappraised.



Of course this is not to deny that the vast majority of our behaviour is on
auto-pilot, as it were.  When I walk to a pub, I do it automatically. 
I do not have to initiate a step on every occasion!  But which pub I
choose to go to, or indeed whether I decide to go out at all, is likely to be
initiated by my consciousness.



Having wrote the above I want to stress that even if one is unconvinced the proof works, the notion that consciousness has no causal efficacy is far from unproblematic.  It might be thought for example that if consciousness is literally the very same thing as specific processes within the brain (as in a certain interpretation of reductive materialism), then since the latter are causally efficacious it follows the former are causally efficacious too.

Now I have elsewhere in my essay Science, the Afterlife, and the Intelligentsia  explained that reductive materialism is simply not compatible with the existence of consciousness. But even leaving this aside, this strategy cannot wholly escape my foregoing argument.  



This is because as materialists (of whatever flavour) they necessarily regard the observable physical processes as comprising a complete explanation of all change in the Universe.  This includes all the physical processes within the brain including those correlated with conscious processes such as thinking.  And such physical processes are directed only via virtue of physical properties as described by the physical sciences. So this entails we need only pay attention to these physical processes and not to the correlated conscious processes to predict someone's chain of thought.

But if someone's chain of thought is entirely predictable and accountable purely through the physical properties of brains, and the conscious angle of meaning and understanding is not required, then a chain of thought doesn't develop according to any understanding at all -- any such understanding is causally redundant.  But then we have no justification whatsoever that any of our thought processes could lead to correct conclusions rather than false conclusions. So even if, contra my Science, the Afterlife, and the Intelligentsia essay, reductive materialism can be squared with the existence of consciousness, we could never have any basis whatsoever for supposing our chains of thoughts when thinking things through will lead to true conclusions rather than false conclusions.  I submit that this is staggeringly implausible...



8/4/16 Update.  Also see my Materialism/Physicalism is incompatible with our ability to reason.

Science, the Afterlife, and the Intelligentsia