Two Alleged Challenges to the Reincarnation Hypothesis
The following blog post is someone's* summary of the research into reincarnation, which on the whole seems fair and balanced. There are two alleged challenges to the reincarnation hypothesis in there that I'd like to address. These challenges are not confined to this specific writer as I occasionally see them expressed elsewhere too. Regarding the first challenge, the author says:
One
of the most significant challenges for the theory of reincarnation is
the lack of any scientifically verifiable mechanism by which it could
occur.
I do not consider this a challenge, least of all a significant one. We simply need to bear in mind that there
is also no scientifically verifiable mechanism by which even our present bodies come to
be associated with consciousness. Indeed, this is why the issue of how consciousness relates to one's body has
been labelled the hard problem (also see this Guardian article). If we have no idea how our everyday embodied consciousness is related to our present bodies, indeed that no such scientific theory even seems possible, then a fortiori we could scarcely be expected to conjure up a mechanism for how reincarnation occurs.
is also no scientifically verifiable mechanism by which even our present bodies come to
be associated with consciousness. Indeed, this is why the issue of how consciousness relates to one's body has
been labelled the hard problem (also see this Guardian article). If we have no idea how our everyday embodied consciousness is related to our present bodies, indeed that no such scientific theory even seems possible, then a fortiori we could scarcely be expected to conjure up a mechanism for how reincarnation occurs.
Immediately after mentioning the first challenge the author presents a second challenge. He (or she, or it) says:
Moreover,
there is no empirical evidence that consciousness or the soul could
survive physical death, as required by the theory of reincarnation.
Obviously, there is a great
deal of evidence. There are near-death experiences and the
closely related phenomenon deathbed visions and other peculiar
occurrences near death. There are past life memories, crisis apparitions, mediumship and other more indirect evidence. Of course, how persuasive we should consider each strand
of evidence is up for debate. One might indeed argue that none of this evidence is
particularly compelling (and there certainly are weaknesses, although I
regard all the evidence as a collective whole to be very compelling).
Nevertheless, evidence it is.
But I’m guessing that by empirical evidence the author and skeptics mean scientific evidence.
More specifically that we have never been able to detect consciousness when it isn't in a body
(i.e. we have never detected disembodied consciousness). That is, leaving aside apparitions, no
one ever
sees disembodied consciousness nor indeed have our scientific
instruments
ever detected any disembodied consciousness. I think the argument would
then be that this strongly suggests that disembodied consciousness does
not exist.
There's an immediate problem here that occurs to me. If our scientific instruments could detect disembodied consciousness, then by definition,
consciousness would then be material or physical or at least have
material aspects. However, this is not something that sophisticated
believers in an afterlife would subscribe to. Consciousness, or the
self, cannot be seen, touched or detected in any manner even when embodied. Indeed, this is why it is concluded by many that it is immaterial. And
if we cannot see or detect consciousness associated with bodies, why on
earth would we have any expectation that we will be able to observe disembodied consciousness?
deal of evidence. There are near-death experiences and the
closely related phenomenon deathbed visions and other peculiar
occurrences near death. There are past life memories, crisis apparitions, mediumship and other more indirect evidence. Of course, how persuasive we should consider each strand
of evidence is up for debate. One might indeed argue that none of this evidence is
particularly compelling (and there certainly are weaknesses, although I
regard all the evidence as a collective whole to be very compelling).
Nevertheless, evidence it is.
But I’m guessing that by empirical evidence the author and skeptics mean scientific evidence.
More specifically that we have never been able to detect consciousness when it isn't in a body
(i.e. we have never detected disembodied consciousness). That is, leaving aside apparitions, no
one ever
sees disembodied consciousness nor indeed have our scientific
instruments
ever detected any disembodied consciousness. I think the argument would
then be that this strongly suggests that disembodied consciousness does
not exist.
There's an immediate problem here that occurs to me. If our scientific instruments could detect disembodied consciousness, then by definition,
consciousness would then be material or physical or at least have
material aspects. However, this is not something that sophisticated
believers in an afterlife would subscribe to. Consciousness, or the
self, cannot be seen, touched or detected in any manner even when embodied. Indeed, this is why it is concluded by many that it is immaterial. And
if we cannot see or detect consciousness associated with bodies, why on
earth would we have any expectation that we will be able to observe disembodied consciousness?
But what if Reductive Materialism is correct?
Typically, when I give such arguments as I have above, people will claim there is a scientifically verifiable mechanism by which bodies come to be associated with consciousness and that we can in fact detect embodied consciousness. This will be the case should consciousness quite literally be what the brain does. Or, alternatively, if consciousness doesn't really exist, and it is merely an illusion created by our brains. In other words, if some variety of reductive materialism is correct.
However, assuming some variety of reductive materialism is a clear case of question-begging since those who believe in reincarnation will reject this position on the mind-body problem; or at least they will if they have in mind some type of self or soul that reincarnates. What the skeptic needs to do, therefore, is to advance arguments for reductive materialism. However, it seems to me that this is an insurmountable challenge.
Other posts in this Reincarnation series:
Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 1: The Increasing Population
However, assuming some variety of reductive materialism is a clear case of question-begging since those who believe in reincarnation will reject this position on the mind-body problem; or at least they will if they have in mind some type of self or soul that reincarnates. What the skeptic needs to do, therefore, is to advance arguments for reductive materialism. However, it seems to me that this is an insurmountable challenge.
Other posts in this Reincarnation series:
Reincarnation and its Critics, Part 1: The Increasing Population
*I say someone, but the article seems very ChatGPT..ish to me. It's reproducing the standard arguments for and objections to reincarnation, but it all seems rather derived and soulless. It is balanced but boring, and nothing novel in the text. Exactly like ChatGPT's responses to me.
